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Evoking Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court recently
decided that the school boards in Jefferson County, Kentucky and Seat-
tle, Washington could not voluntarily do what federal courts once rou-
tinely ordered in the name of Brown: consider race or ethnicity for the
purpose of increasing student integration. While this outcome might
have been the same under the Rehnquist Court, the Roberts Court in
reaching that conclusion indicated a very different approach to the
Equal Protection Clause and Brown v. Board of Education than that of
the Rehnquist Court. The Rehnquist Court typically utilized an interest-
balancing approach to the Equal Protection Clause that considered
many values. The Roberts Court, on the other hand, has begun to mini-
mize the Equal Protection Clause to concern only capitalizing individual
treatment, to the detriment of other values. As a result, the Roberts
Court has narrowed considerably the meaning of Brown v. Board of
Education and calls into question the legitimacy of long-standing, bed-
rock school-desegregation principles.
INTRODUCTION
Three times the Supreme Court has limited the potency of Brown v.
Board of Education' to effectuate change. The first two came about
twenty years after Brown, in 1973 and 1974, as products of the Burger
Court. The first was San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodri-
guez.2 Here the Court held that education is not a fundamental right or
interest and thereby defined Brown as not about equal educational
opportunity for all students (including students in low-funded school
districts), but instead only about state-sponsored racial or ethnic separa-
tion.3 The second was Milliken v. Bradley, the Detroit school-desegrega-
t Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law. Email: parkerwm@wfu.edu.
Many thanks to the University of Miami Law Review for extending me the opportunity to deliver
an earlier version of this paper as part of its conference, The Future of Affirmative Action: Race,
Education, and the Constitution.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
3. See id. at 37-38. For a thorough discussion of this case, see Betsy Levin, The Courts,
Congress, and Educational Adequacy: The Equal Protection Predicament, 39 MD. L. REV. 187,
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tion opinion, where the Court made Brown largely inapplicable to large,
urban, predominately minority school districts and their surrounding
suburban, predominately white school districts.4 Together, these two
decisions isolated students in predominately minority and predominately
poor school districts from the reach of the Equal Protection Clause,
which had the potential to equalize or improve their educational
opportunity.
For thirty years, these two limits on Brown were sufficient. Brown
would concern racial and ethnic separation within school districts not
predominately of one race or ethnicity. Where Brown applied, however,
it reached beyond equal admission standards to all facets of school oper-
ation. That is, Brown required more than race-neutral admission stan-
dards. It also compelled the elimination of present day inequities caused
by the illegal de jure system to the extent practicable. The school-deseg-
regation inquiry included, thus, not just which students were enrolled in
which schools, but also inequalities in staffing, facilities, transportation,
extra-curricular activities, and the quality of education generally.5
This approach largely continued under the Rehnquist Court in its
three school-desegregation opinions.6 The significant contribution of the
Rehnquist Court in defining Brown was limiting the school district's
legal responsibility for continuing segregation on the grounds of causa-
tion.7 That is, it emphasized the requirement that the school districts
were only legally responsible for inequalities caused by their past ille-
gality, a requirement long found in earlier school-desegregation opin-
ions.8 This emphasis, however, was not a radical change to the meaning
of Brown, but more a debate about the extent of judicial power.9
In short, the Rehnquist Court left the basic nature of Brown undis-
198-204 (1979), and James E. Ryan, Sheff, Segregation, and School Finance Litigation, 74
N.Y.U. L. REV. 529, 563-66 (1999).
4. 418 U.S. 717, 737-47 (1974). For a thorough discussion of this case, see Robert D.
Goldstein, A Swann Song for Remedies: Equitable Relief in the Burger Court, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 1, 26-32 (1978) and Mark G. Yudof, School Desegregation: Legal Realism, Reasoned
Elaboration, and Social Science Research in the Supreme Court, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Autumn 1978, at 57, 93-99.
5. The first four factors are the so called Green factors, from Green v. County School Board,
which held that compliance with Brown will concern student assignment, faculty assignment, staff
assignment, facilities, transportation, and extra-curricular activities. 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968). The
Supreme Court subsequently held that quality of education could be added to that list. See
Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 492-93 (1992) (concluding that it was not an abuse of discretion
for a district court to examine quality of education in assessing unitary status).
6. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995); Freeman, 503 U.S. 467; Bd. of Educ. v.
Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991); infra notes 143-44, 177-84 and accompanying text.
7. See Wendy Parker, The Supreme Court and Public Law Remedies: A Tale of Two Kansas
Cities, 50 HASTINGs L.J. 475, 519-21, 528-33 (1999).
8. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I), 433 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1977).
9. See Parker, supra note 7, at 522-28; infra text accompanying note 177.
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turbed. It did so even as it was redefining the rights and remedies in
voting rights and affirmative action in ways generally disfavored by
minorities.10 Interestingly, in both sets of cases-keeping school deseg-
regation largely as it had been, while shifting basic principles in voting
rights and affirmative action to provide new protections to whites-the
Rehnquist Court often weighed multiple constitutional and structural
values."' Thus, the Court would consider individual rights, but also the
harms of segregation and the importance of local control. To borrow a
term coined by Professor Paul Gewirtz in another context, the Rehnquist
Court engaged in "Interest Balancing" when interpreting the Equal Pro-
tection Clause in school-desegregation, affirmative-action, and voting-
rights cases.12
While the Roberts Court is quite young in its tenure, which is
expected to be quite long, it would be hard to define this Court's
approach to school desegregation as moderate.13 Its plurality opinion in
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No.
114 is as significant in its approach to the meaning of Brown as are Rod-
riguez and Milliken. That opinion is the third major limit on Brown
imposed by the Supreme Court.15 Parents Involved signals a direction of
Brown never seen before in the Supreme Court-limiting the goal of
Brown to equal treatment for individuals, foregoing any value in Brown
of the importance of eradicating actual segregation, and signaling a
meaning of Brown advocated by early resisters to the change imposed
10. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 207, 227 (1995) (protecting
whites from race-conscious affirmative action); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 641-42 (1993)
(extending to whites protections from racial gerrymandering of voting districts); Neal Devins,
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena and the Continuing Irrelevance of Supreme Court Affirmative
Action Decisions, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 673, 675-78 (1996) (discussing Adarand); Richard H.
Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting Rights:
Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MicH. L. REV. 483, 490-92
(1993) (discussing Shaw). Similarly, the Rehnquist dramatically redefined state immunity law.
See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363-64 (2001) (reviewing the cases following
Seminole); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-76 (1996) (holding that Congress cannot
override the states' Eleventh Amendment rights through legislation enacted under Article I
powers).
11. See discussion infra Part II.B.
12. See Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 591 (1983) (identifying
one remedial approach to be "Interest Balancing," which deems that some social interests "may
justify some sacrifice of achievable remedial effectiveness"). Here I'm using the term to identify
not social interests that interfere with remedial effectiveness but the balancing of constitutional
values in interpreting the commands of the Equal Protection Clause.
13. Chief Justice Roberts' tenure began in 2005, when he was fifty-years old. See Sheryl Gay
Stolberg & Elisabeth Bumiller, Senate Confirms Roberts as 17th Chief Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
30, 2005, at Al.
14. 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
15. See discussion infra Part II.A.
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by Brown.16 In doing so, the Roberts Court questions the legitimacy of
long-standing school-desegregation opinions. 7
In addition to changing the meaning of Brown, the plurality opinion
signals a very different Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence. 8 While
the Rehnquist Court used an interest-balancing approach to the Equal
Protection Clause, the Roberts Court has begun to minimize the Equal
Protection Clause to concern only capitalizing individual treatment. The
Roberts Court largely ignores constitutional values that hinder maximiz-
ing equal individual treatment, namely anti-segregation and federalism
principles.
This Essay proceeds in two parts. Part I is a brief overview of the
opinion in Parents Involved and contends that the outcome of Parents
Involved might have been the same under the Rehnquist Court. Part II is
the heart of this Essay. Here I argue that Chief Justice Roberts's
approach to the Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence and Brown v.
Board of Education is fundamentally different from the Rehnquist
Court's. He defines only individual treatment of constitutional signifi-
cance at the cost of previously identified constitutional values.
PART I: THE OUTCOME
In his dissenting opinion in Parents Involved, Justice Stevens
opined, "[N]o Member of the Court that I joined in 1975 would have
agreed with today's decision.' 9 Whether this is true or not, the Rehn-
quist Court might have reached the same result as the Roberts Court did
in Parents Involved. In other words, the addition of Chief Justice Rob-
erts and Justice Alito, replacing Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O'Connor, may not have changed the outcome of prohibiting the two
challenged plans.2" This Part briefly reviews the outcome in Parents
Involved and explains why it may have been the same under the Rehn-
quist Court.
Parents Involved concerned two plans, one in Jefferson County,
Kentucky and the other in Seattle, Washington. Both school districts
voluntarily sought to increase integration in their schools.2 ' The Jeffer-
16. See infra notes 107-17 and accompanying text. Some would argue that this is the true
meaning of Brown, and some courts in the immediate aftermath of the two Brown decisions so
decided. That definition of Brown, however, was expressly rejected in Green, a 1968 Supreme
Court case. See Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968).
17. See discussion infra Part II.A.
18. See discussion infra Part H.B.
19. 127 S. Ct. at 2800 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
20. Nor is it clear that the Rehnquist Court would have accepted review of Parents Involved.
It had previously denied certiorari in a very similar case, Comfort v. Lynn School Committee, 546
U.S. 1061, denying cert. to 418 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005).
21. 127 S. Ct. at 2746, 2749.
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son County plan under review concerned elementary-school enroll-
ment.22 Its elementary students were placed in an attendance zone
depending on their residential home and classified as either "black" or
"other. '2 3 Their parents could then make choices within that zone for
their child's elementary school.24 A student's actual assignment would
depend on many factors. One consideration was the student's racial
and ethnic classification and whether the student's enrollment would
benefit or hinder the expected integration levels of each elementary
school.26 The district's overall student population was approximately
thirty-four percent black and sixty-six percent white.27 The school
board's plan required that non-magnet elementary schools enroll
between fifteen and fifty percent black students.2 8 This racial and ethnic
rule affected approximately three percent of student assignments.29
The Seattle plan before the Court addressed high-school assign-
ment.3 ° The school board classified students as either "white" or "non-
white."'" Rising ninth graders could submit preferences for all ten
Seattle high schools.32 Admission depended on several factors, including
how the student's enrollment would affect the school's compliance with
a racial and ethnic standard.33 In Seattle, the school district's overall
student population was roughly sixty percent nonwhite and forty percent
white, and the school board required that high schools be within plus or
minus ten percent of that overall population.34 As in Jefferson County,
racial and ethnic considerations affected small numbers of students, with
around 300 students impacted in some way by the rule.3
Five Justices voted to prohibit both programs: Chief Justice Roberts
22. Id. at 2749.
23. Id. at 2746, 2749-50.
24. Id. at 2749.
25. For example, the school district also considered school capacity, residence, parental
choice, and random assignment. McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834,
842 (W.D. Ky. 2004), aff'd per curiam, 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), rev'd sub nom. Parents
Involved, 127 S. Ct. 2738.
26. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2749-50.
27. Id. at 2749.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 2760.
30. Id. at 2746.
31. Id. at 2747.
32. Id.
33. Id. Other factors included whether a sibling attended the school and the proximity
between the student's home and preferred school. Id.
34. Id.
35. Specifically, 307 students "were affected by the racial tiebreaker." Id. at 2759. Yet, the
Supreme Court concluded that "only [fifty-two] students... were ultimately affected adversely by
the racial tiebreaker in that it resulted in assignment to a school they had not listed as a preference
and to which they would not otherwise have been assigned." Id. at 2760.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
and Justices Alito, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas.3 6 Justice Kennedy
refused, however, to join two parts of Chief Justice Roberts's opinion,
and he wrote a relatively short opinion concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment.37 That left Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and Ste-
vens in dissent.38
Given that four years ago the Supreme Court had upheld the con-
sideration of race and ethnicity in admission to the University of Michi-
gan Law School3 9 and the Court had added two new members since
then, an obvious question arises-would the outcome have been differ-
ent with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor on the Court
rather than Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito? For four reasons, the
decision of the Roberts Court to outlaw the two programs at issue might
have been quite similar to that reached by the Rehnquist Court.
First, the two K-12 programs shared more with the University of
Michigan undergraduate program prohibited by the Rehnquist Court in
Gratz v. Bollinger4" than with the University of Michigan Law School
program upheld in Grutter v. Bollinger.4 The University of Michigan's
undergraduate program had admitted freshman under a 150-point sys-
tem.4 2 One-hundred points guaranteed admission, but admissions coun-
selors could "flag" for additional review certain applications.43 Minority
applicants automatically received twenty points in the admissions pro-
cess, while non-minority applicants did not.' Applicants could also
receive points for many other factors, such as being a legacy or graduat-
ing from a high school with high average SAT scores.4 5
The Supreme Court held this system unconstitutional in Gratz.4 6 In
doing so, the Court emphasized the lack of individual review under the
system, given the mechanical awarding of points based on race and
ethnicity.47 Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion, faulted the sys-
tem for "assign[ing] every underrepresented minority applicant the
same, automatic 20-point bonus without consideration of the particular
background, experiences, or qualities of each individual applicant."48
36. See id. at 2746.
37. See id. at 2788-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
38. See id. at 2797-2800 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2800-37 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
39. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343-44 (2003).
40. 539 U.S. 244, 253-57 (2003).
41. 539 U.S. at 343-44.
42. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 255.
43. Id. at 255-57.
44. Id. at 255. More precisely, applicants who were identified as African American, Hispanic,
or Native American received additional admission points. Id. at 253-54.
45. Id. at 255.
46. Id. at 275-76.
47. Id. at 272.
48. Id. at 276-77 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In addition, Justice O'Connor also faulted the
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She, along with five other Justices, concluded that the system therefore
lacked the requisite narrow tailoring. 4
In Jefferson County and Seattle, race and ethnicity automatically
meant different treatment, just as was true in Gratz. In all three situa-
tions-the University of Michigan undergraduate, Jefferson elementary,
and Seattle high school admissions-race alone did not determine
admission, as was often the case under de jure segregation. Students
were not denied or granted admission simply because of their race; other
factors mattered as well. Yet, a student's designated race or ethnicity
operated as an absolute, mechanical tiebreaker in all three instances. Stu-
dents in the same position for other admission factors would be treated
differently because of their race or ethnicity, and the different treatment
would mean a mechanical admission of some students because of their
race or ethnicity. That is, some students were admitted due to many
factors, but a determining, "decisive" factor was race and ethnicity. °
Second, the University of Michigan Law School considered not just
merely race and ethnicity, but also meaningfully evaluated non-racial
diversity factors.5 ' The policy gave the following as examples of non-
racial and non-ethnic diversity factors: "admittees who have lived or
traveled widely abroad, are fluent in several languages, have overcome
personal adversity and family hardship, have exceptional records of
extensive community services, and have had successful careers in other
fields."52 This lead to "highly individualized, holistic review of each
applicant's file, giving serious consideration to all the ways an applicant
might contribute to a diverse educational environment."53 The Court
specifically noted that the broad definition of diversity was reflected in
actual admission decisions as well.54 This broad approach to diversity
was critical to the Supreme Court upholding the legality of the program
because it indicated true individual review, rather than the automatic
granting of automatic points to other characteristics: "[T]he selection index, by setting up
automatic, predetermined point allocations for the soft variables, ensures that the diversity
contributions of applicants cannot be individually assessed." Id. at 279.
49. See id. at 275 (majority opinion). In dissenting in Gratz, Justice Ginsburg implied that the
point system in Gratz only made explicit what was also present in Grutter: A plus factor was
afforded to minority applicants. See id. at 304-05 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
50. See id. at 272 (majority opinion) (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 317 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.)).
51. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 337 (2003); see also id. at 338 ("What is more, the
Law School actually gives substantial weight to diversity factors besides race.").
52. Id. at 338.
53. Id. at 337.
54. See id. at 338 ("The Law School frequently accepts nonminority applicants with grades
and test scores lower than underrepresented minority applicants (and other nonminority
applicants) who are rejected.").
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treatment of race and ethnicity in Gratz.55
The two Parents Involved plans, however, defined their overall pur-
poses much more narrowly than the University of Michigan Law
School. While many other, non-racial factors were at play in admis-
sion-namely geographic proximity between the student's home and the
school, the presence of a sibling at the school, and the capacity of the
school 56-only race and ethnicity were relevant to the school district's
stated goals.57
Even the school boards' definition of race was narrower than that in
Grutter. The University of Michigan Law School gave particular atten-
tion to three racial groups typically underrepresented in its student body:
African Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans.58 Yet, the classi-
fications used in Jefferson County and Seattle were far less precise. Only
two racial and ethnic categories were recognized: black and nonblack in
Jefferson County, white and nonwhite in Seattle.59 The racial and ethnic
makeup of the Seattle, however, was much more complex. Seattle had
many different groups comprising its "nonwhite" category; yet, it classi-
fied these students similarly.6" The Supreme Court specifically criticized
Seattle's characterization of a school district as racially unbalanced if a
school had "30 percent Asian-American, 25 percent African-American,
25 percent Latino, and 20 percent white students," but would define a
school as balanced if it were evenly split between Asian American and
55. See id. at 337 ("[T]he Law School's race-conscious admissions program adequately
ensures that all factors that may contribute to student body diversity are meaningfully considered
alongside race in admissions decisions."); id. ("Like the Harvard plan, the Law School's
admissions policy 'is flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the
particular qualifications of each applicant, and to place them on the same footing for
consideration, although not necessarily according them the same weight."' (quoting Bakke, 438
U.S. at 317 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.))). The dissenting Justices in Grutter sharply criticized
how "true" that individual review was in actual practice. See id. at 385-86 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he ostensibly flexible nature of the Law School's admission program ... appears
to be, in practice, a carefully managed program designed to ensure proportionate representation of
applicants from selected minority groups."); id. at 389 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("[T]he concept
of critical mass is a delusion used by the Law School to mask its attempt to make race an
automatic factor in most instances and to achieve numerical goals indistinguishable from
quotas.").
56. See supra notes 25, 33 and accompanying text.
57. See supra text accompanying notes 28, 34.
58. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 316.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 23, 31.
60. Specifically, Seattle had 23.8% Asian American, 23.1% African American, and 10.3%
Latino student populations. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct.
2738, 2747 n.2 (2007); see also id. at 2790-91 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) ("It [the Seattle School District] has failed to explain why, in a district composed of
a diversity of races, with fewer than half of the students classified as 'white,' it has employed the
crude racial categories of 'white' and 'non-white' as the basis for its assignment decisions.").
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white students.6" This limited view of race also narrowed the definition
of what counts as diversity in ways contrary to Grutter's broad quest for
diversity.
Third, both school districts in Parents Involved numerically speci-
fied the desired student population.62 The law school in Grutter, on the
other hand, sought an undefined "critical mass."63 The law school
enrolled minorities in a range from 13.5% to 20.1% during the years in
question, and no one confessed to having a precise numerical goal.6 4 The
absence of a numerical standard was key to the Court's finding of indi-
vidual, constitutional treatment rather than treatment based on race.65
The two K-12 school systems, however, had a harder time justify-
ing their numerical standards. The plurality specifically faulted the plans
for their numerical goals, which were entirely dependent on the school
district's demographic student population and resulted in admission not
based solely on individual treatment.66
The fourth reason concerns deference. 67 The Grutter Court afforded
the defendants substantial deference in its constitutional review. The
decision to defer to the University of Michigan defendants was key to
61. Id. at 2754 (majority opinion).
62. See supra text accompanying notes 28, 34.
63. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 316.
64. See id. at 336. In devising the admission policies under review in Grutter, the law school
had dropped an earlier reference to a numerical standard. See GREG STOHR, A BLACK AND WHITE
CASE: How AFFIRMATIVE ACTION SURVIVED ITS GREATEST LEGAL CHALLENGE 82 (2004).
65. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 335-36 ("The Law School's goal of attaining a critical mass of
underrepresented minority students does not transform its program into a quota."); id. at 336
("'[S]ome attention to numbers,' without more, does not transform a flexible admissions system
into a rigid quota." (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 323 (1978)
(opinion of Powell, J.) (alteration in original))). The Court reached this conclusion even though
narrower ranges existed in different time periods-as Justice Kennedy noted in his opinion. See
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 389 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Further, Chief Justice Rehnquist demonstrated
that admission rates of racial and ethnic groups closely mirrored their application rates over time.
For example, the percentage of Latino applicants in 1995 was 5.1%, with their admission rate at
5%. See id. at 384 tbl.2 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). He demonstrated similarly tight correlations
for African Americans, Latinos, and Native Americans from 1995 to 2000. Id. at 384 tbls.l-3.
The plurality in Parents Involved noted the disagreement in Grutter over the absence of numerical
standards for the Michigan Law School program. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2757
(plurality opinion).
66. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2755 (plurality opinion) ("[T]he racial demographics
in each district-whatever they happen to be-drive the required 'diversity' numbers."). Nor were
the numbers educationally justified. Id. at 2756.
67. Two more reasons are worth briefly noting as well. Grutter concerned higher education,
which is entitled to unique constitutional protections. See id. at 2754 (majority opinion); Grutter,
539 U.S. at 329. Further, without the diversity plan, the student demographics at the University of
Michigan Law School would be noticeably different. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 338. Yet, only a few
students were affected by the plans in Parents Involved. See supra notes 29, 35 and accompanying
text.
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upholding the constitutionality of the law school's plan.68 The plurality
in Parents Involved, however, quickly decided that the two K-12 school
boards before it were not entitled to any deference. 69 This conclusion, I
argue below, signals a very different approach to equal protection than
seen by the Rehnquist Court in the school arena.7° Yet, it is entirely
conceivable that the Rehnquist Court would have, in the end, afforded
these two school districts less deference (but not the complete lack of
deference in Parents Involved) than it did to the University of Michigan
Law School and-given the importance of deference in constitutionaliz-
ing the law school's plan-possibly hold the K-12 plans
unconstitutional.
The deference afforded to the University of Michigan Law School
is arguably unprecedented. 7' The Grutter opinion only uses a few
paragraphs to articulate the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause, and
merely repeats standard rules. The Court's analysis really begins in
Grutter when Justice O'Connor offers this principle: "The Law School's
educational judgment that such diversity is essential to its education
mission is one to which we defer."' 72 That declaration, the first sentence
after the majority states its conclusion that diversity can be a compelling
governmental interest, is a driving force in the majority's analysis. This
deference means the majority accepts the defendant's story more than
questions it and effectively ensures the story's constitutionality.
That extraordinary deference arose in large part from two factors,
neither present in Parents Involved. First, the diversity argument of the
68. See Michelle Adams, Stifling the Potential of Grutter v. Bollinger: Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 88 B.U. L. REV. 937, 939 (2008) ("The
Grutter Court's deferential application of strict scrutiny review clearly affected the outcome.");
Wendy Parker, The Story of Grutter v. Bollinger: Affirmative Action Wins, in EDUCATION LAW
STORIES 83, 98 (Michael A. Olivas & Ronna Greff Schneider eds., 2007).
69. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2766 (plurality opinion) ("Such deference is
fundamentally at odds with our equal protection jurisprudence." (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 506 n.l (2005))).
70. See discussion infra Part II.B.5.
71. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 350 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Nor
does the Constitution countenance the unprecedented deference the Court gives to the Law
School, an approach inconsistent with the very concept of 'strict scrutiny."'); id. at 380
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (faulting the majority's "unprecedented" deference"); id. at 388
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (declaring the majority's approach not strict scrutiny and "nothing short
of perfunctory"); Michelle Adams, Searching for Strict Scrutiny in Grutter v. Bollinger, 78 TUL.
L. REV. 1941, 1943 (2004) ("Grutter, with its application of what the Court resolutely calls 'strict
scrutiny,' but in an undeniably relaxed manner, is consistent with a robust rather than restrained
vision of judicial review."); Jack Balkin, Plessy, Brown, and Grutter: A Play in Three Acts, 26
CARDOZO L. REV. 1689, 1724 (2005) ("The fact that the Court engages in this sort of deference is
a tell-tale sign that it is not applying a scrutiny as strict as it claims.").
72. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.
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University of Michigan drew almost universal support from "elites."73
Almost a 100 colleges, universities, and educational associations filed
amici briefs supporting diversity, as did 124 members of the House, 13
Senators, and 23 states. 4 A Fortune 500 Supreme Court amicus brief
included sixty-five companies.7 5 In addition, seventeen media compa-
nies, the AFL-CIO, eleven Indian Tribes, and eight Jewish groups filed
amici briefs.76 Law students numbering 13,922 submitted their own
eight-page brief.77 A brief by twenty-nine retired military officers-a
number capped by the brief authors 78-on the need for diversity in the
military academies drew intense questioning during the Supreme Court
oral argument; the opinions of these retired officers even made its way
into the majority opinion.79 A total of 102 amici briefs supported the
University of Michigan defendants.8 °
Only nineteen amici briefs opposed the University of Michigan
defendants, and none by any educational institution, major business, or
member of Congress. 8" Only one State-Florida-filed on the side of
the plaintiffs, but even that brief accepted the value of diversity.8 2 Simi-
larly, the brief by the United States in opposition to the University of
Michigan defendants recognized the value of diversity, although it did
not conclude whether diversity was a compelling governmental inter-
est.83 As noted by Professor Neal Devins, "[W]hen compared to other
controversial social issues (abortion or religion in the schools), the
absence of important, powerful voices on one side of the issue seems
especially stark."84
The support of the two K-12 school boards, on the other hand, was
73. See Parker, supra note 68, at 95-97.
74. Neal Devins, Explaining Grutter v. Bollinger, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 347, 366-68 (2003).
For a thorough look at the amicus filings, see Devins, supra, at 366-72.
75. See id. at 369 & n.102.
76. See Parker, supra note 68, at 95-96.
77. Brief of 13,922 Current Law Students at Accredited American Law Schools as Amici
Curiae in Support of Respondents, Gruter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241).
78. STOHR, supra note 64, at 248.
79. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331 ("[A] 'highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps . . is
essential to the military's ability to fulfill its principle mission to provide national security."
(quoting Consolidated Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 5, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241))); Devins, supra note 74, at 369.
80. Devins, supra note 74, at 366.
81. See id. at 366-68.
82. See Brief of the State of Florida & the Honorable John Ellis "Jeb" Bush, Governor, as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 1, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241).
83. See Brief for United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 8, Grutter, 539 U.S.
306 (No. 02-241) ("Ensuring that public institutions, especially educational institutions, are open
and accessible to a broad and diverse array of individuals, including individuals of all races and
ethnicities, is an important and entirely legitimate government objective.").
84. See Devins, supra note 74, at 370.
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strong but more muted than the support for diversity for postsecondary
education. While the amici briefs overwhelmingly supported the school
districts-forty-eight briefs versus twelve briefs-the breadth of the
support was thinner than that for the University of Michigan defendants.
In Parents Involved, no Fortune 500 brief was filed, nor did the AFL-
CIO, Indian Tribes, or Jewish groups file briefs. The number of impor-
tant signatories declined as well. The number of states declined from the
twenty-three in Grutter to twenty.85 The Senators went from thirteen to
seven; 86 members of the House of Representatives fell from 124 to 69.87
Retired military officers again filed a brief, but this time only ten signed,
and the brief got no attention during oral argument or in the opinions of
the Court.
88
The second reason the law school was given a level of deference
that the school boards might not have gotten from the Rehnquist Court
goes to the quality of the plans before the Court. The Grutter plan was
written by law professors at what Justice O'Connor calls "among the
Nation's top law schools" in her opening paragraph.8 9 Ted Shaw-a
professor with a former life as a prominent civil-rights litigator-chaired
the committee devising the policy, and the committee expected future
litigation on the plan's constitutionality. 90 The law school decided to
revise its admission policy so that it would comply with Justice Powell's
opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,91 and, with
law professors in charge, it is not surprising that they got it somewhat
right.92
85. See Brief of the States of New York et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at
30-32, Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (Nos.
05-908 & 05-915); Devins, supra note 74, at 366-68. Florida again was the only State with an
amicus brief in opposition to the defendants. See Brief of Florida Governor John Ellis "Jeb" Bush
& the State Board of Education as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Parents Involved, 127
S. Ct. 2738 (Nos. 05-908 & 05-915). It went so far as to call for the overruling of Gruter's
command that diversity could be a compelling governmental interest. Id. at 6, 9.
86. See Brief for Amici Curiae Senators Edward M. Kennedy et al. in Support of Respondents
at 1, Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (Nos. 05-908 & 05-915); Devins, supra note 74, at 367.
87. See Brief of Rep. Jim McDermott et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 1,
Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (Nos. 05-908 & 05-915); Devins, supra note 74, at 367.
88. See Brief for Hon. Clifford L. Alexander, Jr. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 1, Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (Nos. 05-908 & 05-915). In the context of
K-12 schooling on military bases, which are well known for their successful integration, the
retired military officers cited no examples of determining student admission on that basis. See id.
at 11-15.
89. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 312 (2003).
90. See STOHR, supra note 64, at 81-82.
91. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
92. Law professors are not always successful in drafting policies surviving constitutional
challenge. See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47,
70 (2006) (rejecting, by an eight-to-zero vote, an attempt by law professors to have the Solomon
Amendment declared unconstitutional).
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The school districts, on the other hand, had plans full of ambiguity
that could have proven as troubling to the Rehnquist court as they were
to the Roberts Court. Both school districts had broad racial and ethnic
classifications, as discussed previously.93 This was particularly trouble-
some in Seattle, where the student population was more complex than
the white and nonwhite categories capture.94 Further, the Lexington plan
lacked clarity about which grades it covered and how the policy was
actually practiced.95 Nor could the school districts demonstrate much
urgency to their needs. While the University of Michigan Law School
demonstrated that its overall minority enrollment would drop from
14.5% to 4%,96 the school districts could not demonstrate that the over-
all student demographic distribution would be very different without the
race conscious plans. 97 While this could indicate narrow tailoring, the
Supreme Court deemed it as an indication of a lack of need. For these
reasons, the Rehnquist Court would likely have had difficulty in finding
the plans in Parents Involved narrowly tailored.
This argument that the Rehnquist Court might have decided the
outcome of Parents Involved the same as the Roberts Court is not to
suggest that the outcome in Parents Involved necessarily follows Gratz
and Grutter.9 8 After the two University of Michigan cases, most of the
93. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
94. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2756-57
(2007) (plurality opinion) ("When the actual racial breakdown is considered, enrolling students
without regard to their race yields a substantially diverse student body under any definition of
diversity."); id. at 2790-91 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
("[Seattle] has failed to explain why, in a district composed of a diversity of races, with fewer than
half of the students classified as 'white,' it has employed the crude racial categories of 'white' and
,non-white' as the basis for its assignment decisions."); id. at 2791 ("Other problems are evident
in Seattle's system, but there is no need to address them now."). But see id. at 2829 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) ("Seattle's experience indicates that the relevant circumstances in respect to each of
these different minority groups are roughly similar ...."); id. ("Seattle has been able to achieve a
desirable degree of diversity without the greater emphasis on race that drawing fine lines among
minority groups would require.").
95. Id. at 2750 n.8 (majority opinion) (noting that the policy was applied to a kindergartener,
when the terms of the plans did not); id. at 2790 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (noting the many "contradictions and confusions" of the Jefferson County plan).
Justice Breyer argues that the plans are more understandable than Justice Kennedy presents. See
id. at 2827-29 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
96. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 320 (2003).
97. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2793 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment) ("[T]he small number of assignments affected suggests that the schools could
have achieved their stated ends through different means."); id. at 2760 (majority opinion) ("[T]he
minimal impact of the districts' racial classifications on school enrollment casts doubt on the
necessity of using racial classifications.").
98. The two opinions themselves are, after all, far from clear, as Justice Scalia argued in his
Grutter opinion. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 348 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("Unlike a clear constitutional holding that racial preferences in state educational institutions are
impermissible, or even a clear anticonstitutional holding that racial preferences in state
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courts of appeals considering the issue determined that the diversity
rationale applied in the K-12 setting and that plans before them seeking
to achieve that diversity, while fundamentally different from the merit-
based plan in Grutter, were still constitutional.99 That precedent is easily
read as consistent with Grutter. The Grutter Court was fairly expansive
in defining the need and reach of the diversity justification, and K-12
schools could have easily fit within that diversity justification."
I'm not arguing, however, that Parents Involved is inconsistent
with Grutter. Instead, I'm contending that although one could read Par-
ents Involved as consistent with Grutter-the topic of this part-Parents
Involved still signals a very different approach to Brown v. Board of
Education and the Equal Protection Clause than seen in the Rehnquist
Court. This is the topic of the next Part.
PART II: A COLOR BLIND Focus ON INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
What was most surprising about Parents Involved was not its out-
come, but the plurality decision, authored by Chief Justice Roberts and
joined by Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas. That opinion defined the
Equal Protection Clause and Brown v. Board of Education in ways sig-
nificantly different than that of the Rehnquist Court. That is the subject
of this Part.
A. Redefining Brown v. Board of Education
In the five opinions that make up Parents Involved, Brown v. Board
of Education was evoked about seventy-seven times.' 01 To close his
educational institutions are OK, today's Grutter-Gratz split double header seems perversely
designed to prolong the controversy and the litigation."); see also Wendy Parker, The Legal Cost
of the "Split Double Header" of Gratz and Grutter, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 587, 595-603
(2003) (analyzing the questions resolved by Grutter and Gratz and those left open).
99. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162,
1192-93 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (holding diversity to be a compelling governmental interest in
K-12 setting and that having race be a tie-breaker for high school admissions is narrowly
tailored), rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 2738; McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 416 F.3d 513, 514 (6th
Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (affirming district court's conclusion that assignment plan, which used
racial guidelines, was constitutional), rev'd sub nom. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. 2738; Comfort
v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 12-23 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc) (upholding race-based transfer
as a part of voluntary-desegregation planning and diversity as a compelling governmental interest
in K-12 schools). But see Cavalier v. Caddo Parish Sch. Bd., 403 F.3d 246, 260 (5th Cir. 2005)
(deeming a goal of fifty-fifty plus or minus fifteen percent a quota and different racial admissions
scores not narrowly tailored, and leaving open the question of whether diversity a compelling
governmental interest at K-12 level).
100. See Adams, supra note 68, at 946-47; James E. Ryan, Voluntary Integration: Asking the
Right Questions, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 327, 336-39 (2006).
101. Specifically, Brown was evoked about ten times by Chief Justice Roberts, twenty-five
times by Justice Thomas, three times by Justice Kennedy, seven times by Justice Stevens, and
twenty-two times by Justice Breyer.
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opinion, Chief Justice Roberts argued that the decision in Parents
Involved was "faithful to the heritage of Brown."'' 1 2 In support, he
quotes the brief and oral argument of the plaintiffs in Brown."0 3 Chief
Justice Roberts defines the quest of the Brown plaintiffs for one purpose
only: "that no State has any authority under the equal-protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to use race as a factor in affording educa-
tional opportunities among its citizens."'"
It is interesting that Chief Justice Roberts chose to invoke the
words of the litigants in Brown. The arguments of litigants in another
case, albeit a very famous case, are usually not used by Justices as justi-
fications for their conclusions. Nor were the lawyers pleased to be
quoted by Chief Justice Roberts.
0 5
Yet, the implications could not be more significant. With the words
of the Brown litigants, Chief Justice Roberts legitimizes the reduction of
the goal of Brown to two phrases in Brown v. Board of Education
(Brown 1/)" 6 : admission on "a nondiscriminatory basis" and admission
"on a nonracial basis."' 7 Then individual treatment is equalized, and the
ultimate goal of Brown achieved.1
0 8
In taking this approach, Chief Justice Roberts returns the Court to a
debate that first began in the aftermath of Brown H over whether an
adequate school-desegregation remedy could be a racially neutral
assignment that produced racially segregated schooling. Southern states
and school districts very often responded to Brown H with student-
assignment plans that were race neutral by their terms, but incredibly
segregative. They argued that these plans complied with the mandate of
Brown because children were no longer assigned by skin color. One
such approach was freedom-of-choice plans by which parents could
choose the school for their children." 9 The overwhelming majority of
parents choose the school historically associated with their race." 0 Some
102. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2767 (plurality opinion).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 2767-68 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument
at 7, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Nos. 1, 2, 4 & 10) (statement of Robert L.
Carter)).
105. Adam Liptak, The Same Words, but Differing Views, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2007, at A24
(noting that Judge Robert L. Carter, Professor Jack Greenberg, and William T. Coleman, Jr.
dispute Chief Justice Roberts's use of the plaintiffs' arguments in Brown).
106. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
107. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2768 (plurality opinion) (emphasis omitted) (quoting
Brown I1, 349 U.S. at 300-01).
108. See id. at 2767-68 (limiting Brown to a concern with individual treatment).
109. See Wendy Parker, Connecting the Dots: Grutter, School Desegregation, and Federalism,
45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1691, 1717 & n.134 (2004).
110. See James R. Dunn, Title V, the Guidelines and School Desegregation in the South, 53
VA. L. REV. 42, 44, 56, 64-65 (1967).
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courts initially upheld these plans as fulfilling the mandate of Brown."'
Even more pernicious, perhaps, were the pupil-assignment laws, passed
by ten of the eleven former states of the confederacy (all but Georgia)
from 1954 to 1957.112 The assignment laws were race neutral but clearly
designed to continue segregation. Factors in admission included "aca-
demic preparation, [s]cholastic aptitude and relative intelligence or
mental energy or ability of pupil, and [p]sychological qualification of
pupil for type of teaching and associations involved.""' 3 "[C]ourts in the
Fourth and Fifth Circuits held the North Carolina and Alabama statutes
facially constitutional."'
Both freedom-of-choice plans and pupil-assignment laws would
satisfy the argument of one of the Brown counsel from oral argument,
and quoted by Chief Justice Roberts, that states were not to "use race as
a factor" in student assignment. Yet, the Supreme Court, beginning with
Green v. County School Board, has held that Brown promised more than
race neutrality." 5 The Court in that case deemed freedom-of-choice
plans inadequate not because they did not treat individuals equally, but
because they failed to produce the integration promised by Brown."1
6
Further, courts eventually struck down pupil-assignment laws in as-
applied challenges because those laws, too, were continuing the segrega-
tion of the de jure segregation.' 7 After Green, the school-desegregation
remedy sought to redress the segregation produced by de jure systems in
the so-called Green factors-faculties, staffs, facilities, transportation,
and extra-curricular activities." 8 After Green and until the plurality
opinion in Parents Involved, southern states and school districts lost
before the Supreme Court with the argument that Brown was only about
race-neutral admission standards." 19
The idea that Brown was only about equal treatment of individuals
was also not the analysis of the Rehnquist Court in its trio of school-
desegregation opinions in the 1990s.' 20 In all three opinions, the Rehn-
quist Court increased the possibility of school-desegregation litigation
111. See, e.g., Bowman v. County Sch. Bd., 382 F.2d 326, 327, 332 (4th Cir. 1967) (en banc)
(upholding freedom-of-choice plan for Charles City County, Virginia).
112. Parker, supra note 109, at 1709.
113. Id. at 1710 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
114. Id.
115. 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968).
116. Id. at 441.
117. Parker, supra note 109, at 1713.
118. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
119. See generally J. HARVIE WILKINsON 11, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE (1979) (discussing the
Supreme Court's responses to arguments that racial neutrality alone fulfilled the mandate of
Brown).
120. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992); Bd. of
Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
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coming to an end.12 ' The Court said that it was doing so in the name of
local control,1 22 and because of the limited causal link between present
day inequalities and past illegality. 123 At no time, however, did the Court
suggest that integration was not a goal of school-desegregation litigation
or that race-neutral admission standards were the only goal.
Thus, in Board of Education v. Dowell, Chief Justice Rehnquist
wrote that district courts must determine "whether the vestiges of past
discrimination had been eliminated to the extent practicable .... [by]
look[ing] not only at student assignments, but 'to every facet of school
operations-faculty, staff, transportation, extra-curricular activities and
facilities.' 1, 24 These Green factors on the vestiges of discrimination still
needed to be eliminated-to the extent traceable to de jure segrega-
tion-under Dowell. The race-neutral policies of the school board would
not be sufficient by themselves to release judicial supervision.
Similarly, in Freeman v. Pitts, Justice Kennedy quotes at length the
words of Brown on the problem of segregation, and he defines "the prin-
cipal wrong of the de jure system [as] the injuries and stigma inflicted
upon the race disfavored by the violation."1 25 He also focuses on the
Green factors, along with the quality of education, as indicating whether
the vestiges of discrimination are still present.1 26 Lastly, Chief Justice
Rehnquist in Missouri v. Jenkins continues to focus on the vestiges of
discrimination. 1
27
This is not to suggest that these opinions were uncontroversial.
They were; Justice Marshall vigorously dissented in Dowell,128 as did
Justice Souter in Jenkins.1 29 Justices in Freeman likewise disagreed on
the reach and meaning of the majority's test for "partial unitary sta-
121. See Wendy Parker, The Decline of Judicial Decisionmaking: School Desegregation and
District Court Judges, 81 N.C. L. REv. 1623, 1645-52 (2003); Wendy Parker, The Future of
School Desegregation, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1157, 1162-74 (2000).
122. Parker, supra note 109, at 1728-30.
123. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 496.
124. 498 U.S. at 250 (footnote omitted) (quoting Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435
(1968)).
125. 503 U.S. at 485 (emphasis omitted).
126. Id. at 486.
127. 515 U.S. 70, 89 (1995) ("The ultimate inquiry is 'whether the [constitutional violator]
ha[s]complied in good faith with the desegregation decree ... and whether the vestiges of past
discrimination ha[ve] been eliminated to the extent practicable."' (first, second, and fourth
alterations in original) (quoting Freeman, 503 U.S. at 492)).
128. 498 U.S. at 251 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Specifically, Justice Marshall criticized the
majority for not recognizing the return of one-race schools as a vestige of discrimination and thus
in need of redress. See id. at 257 ("In my view, a standard for dissolution of a desegregation
decree must take into account the unique harm associated with a system of racially identifiable
schools and must expressly demand the elimination of such schools.").
129. See 515 U.S. at 138 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter complained that the majority
went beyond the issue before it effectively to "overrule a unanimous constitutional precedent of
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tus.' 30 But the disagreements were more about the limits of judicial
power and not directly about the meaning of Brown, the approach of the
plurality in Parents Involved. In key aspects, the disputes in the Rehn-
quist Court mirror a long-standing debate about the remedial power of
the federal courts in injunctive-relief cases-whether the courts are con-
fined to putting plaintiffs in their "rightful" position (the position the
plaintiffs would have occupied but for the violation) or can do what
equity allows. 131
The majorities in Dowell, Freeman, and Jenkins were all confining
the remedial power of the courts to the rightful-position doctrine, which
explains their requiring a tight causal link between the de jure violation
and present-day inequities. Those not joining the majorities were instead
advocating a broader judicial power to pursue equity. 31 While debates
about remedies are very often debates about rights, 133 no one was sug-
gesting that Brown meant one thing and only one thing, as Chief Justice
Roberts did in Parents Involved. Instead, all the Justices were assuming
that Brown meant an end to segregation, which the majorities limited to
segregation caused by the de jure violation. The dissenting Justices dis-
agreed on the grounds that judicial power extended to less causally
related inequities.
The moderation of the Rehnquist Court in its school-desegregation
opinions is also indicated by the far-from-moderate approaches that
Court took in other constitutional matters. The Court made bold changes
in the limits of the Eleventh Amendment on Congressional Article I
power, 134 in the reach of the Equal Protection Clause to the rights of
whites to challenge racial gerrymandering,' 35 and in the legality of
20 years' standing, which was not even addressed in argument, was mentioned merely in passing
by one of the parties, and discussed by another of them only in a misleading way." Id. at 139.
130. See 503 U.S. at 507 (Souter, J., concurring); id. at 509-10 (Blackmun, J., concurring in
the judgment).
131. See Parker, supra note 7, at 522-33.
132. See supra notes 127-29.
133. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Civil Rights and Remedies, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
103, 103 (1991) ("When we hear an objection to the remedy, it is almost always a disguised
objection to the definition of what is due, and not to the methods used to apply the balm.");
Gewirtz, supra note 12, at 593 n.16 ("Criticism of a remedy ...may reflect criticism of the
underlying right."); Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 GEO. L.J.
1355, 1382 (1991) ("At least some of the debate over the court's proper remedial role is a thinly
veiled attack on the prevailing interpretation of the Constitution.").
134. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363-64 (2001) (reviewing the cases
following Seminole); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-76 (1996) (holding that
Congress cannot override the states' Eleventh Amendment rights through legislation enacted
under Article I powers).
135. See, e.g., Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 480 (2003) (setting the standard for a section
5 of the Voting Rights Act review of majority-minority voting districts); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S.
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affirmative action in government contracting. 3 6 Brown, on the other
hand, was largely left alone.
Nor can the three school-desegregation opinions from the Rehn-
quist Court be dismissed as irrelevant to the meaning of Brown or the
use of Brown in the Parents Involved plurality opinion because they
address the school desegregation remedy instead of the school desegre-
gation right. As has long been documented, right and remedy are inter-
dependent in public-law rights, with no clear demarcation between right
and remedy.137 The two instead explain and depend on each other. The
right to be free of de jure segregation is only knowable by referencing
what the remedy is-the remedy informs the right, just as the right
informs the remedy. In short, the meaning of Brown is consistently
found in its remedial implications.
B. Limiting the Equal Protection Clause
The Parents Involved plurality reduces not just Brown to one value,
but reduces the Equal Protection Clause as well. To Chief Justice Rob-
erts, equal individual treatment is the sole fulfillment of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, to be pursued even when it is inconsistent with other
constitutional values previously recognized by the Court. I describe this
as "Capitalizing Individual Rights." The Rehnquist Court, on the other
hand, recognized multiple equal-protection values and engaged in
"Interest Balancing" when it limited integration."'
1. PARENTS INVOLVED AND INDIVIDUAL TREATMENT
The plurality opinion in Parents Involved defined the ultimate goal
of the Equal Protection Clause as the equal treatment of individuals
through the end of considering race and ethnicity in government deci-
sion-making. 3 9 This conclusion depends on two steps: first, that the
630, 658 (1993) (holding that white plaintiffs have an Equal Protection Clause claim to challenge
to a majority-minority voting district).
136. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 236 (1995) (holding that strict
scrutiny applied to minority set asides for federal government construction contracts).
137. See Parker, supra note 7, at 517-18.
138. For example, the Rehnquist Court limited the reach of school-desegregation remedies
because of local control and limited judicial power. See Parker, supra note 109, at 1705-16. The
Court never defined integration as unimportant, as the plurality arguably did in Parents Involved.
See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2761-68 (2007)
(plurality opinion).
139. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct at 2768 (plurality opinion) ("The way to stop
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race."); id. at 2792
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("In the real world, it is
regrettable to say, [Justice Harlan's color-blind axiom] cannot be a universal constitutional
principle.").
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Equal Protection Clause protects individuals, not groups. 40 The second
is defining "the 'ultimate goal"' as "eliminating entirely from govern-
mental decisionmaking such irrelevant factors as a human being's
race."' 4'a The plurality makes only a brief, passing mention of why dif-
ferent treatment is harmful, and the injuries are all described only in
terms of their effect on individuals. 142
The Court does not seem to be advocating, however, the complete
abandonment of racial and ethnic classifications in government. The plu-
rality affirms the legitimacy of federal statutes, for example, that con-
sider and legitimate the relevancy of racial and ethnic classifications.
43
Instead, the "color blind" approach is geared toward achieving the treat-
ment of individuals without regard to their race. This does not require
the complete absence of race or ethnicity in decision-making; only that
the race and ethnicity of an individual does not change the treatment of
that individual. That is how the school boards in Lexington and Seattle
failed.
2. OTHER EDUCATION OPINIONS AND INDIVIDUAL TREATMENT
Interestingly, in the school context, individual treatment had
received relatively little equal-protection attention. This is most easily
demonstrated in the school-desegregation arena, where the analysis
includes no recognition of individual rights. For example, the Court has
never recognized any individual, constitutional right to attend a neigh-
borhood school, to choose a school, or to receive particular educational
offerings. 44 Neither has the court identified any individual burden of
being bussed or being subject to any other school-desegregation practice
of any constitutional significance. The trio of school-desegregation opin-
140. Id. at 2757 (plurality opinion) ("[A]t the heart of the Constitution's guarantee of equal
protection lies the simple command that the Government must treat citizens as individuals, not as
simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or national class." (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515
U.S. 900, 911 (1995))).
141. Id. at 2758 (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989)
(plurality opinion)).
142. The harms are all expressed in terms of how they affect individuals. See id. at 2767. For
example, the plurality quotes prior opinions about the general harms suffered if individuals are
treated differently. Id. The plurality Justices could have held the programs unconstitutional and
still at least stated the value of integration-as Justice Kennedy did in his concurring opinion. See
id. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Instead, the plurality
decided to take a different approach that stressed only the importance of a color-blind approach
that treated individuals the same regardless of race or ethnicity.
143. Id. at 2766 (plurality opinion) (concluding without analysis that the No Child Left
Behind's requirement of academic progress of all racial and ethnic groups has "nothing to do with
the pertinent issues in these cases").
144. Yet, Title VI guarantees access to curriculum to English language learners. See, e.g., Lau
v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 564-69 (1974).
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ions of the Rehnquist Court has nothing to say about individual rights,
with the exception of one concurring opinion by Justice Thomas. 4 5 Oth-
erwise, individual rights are of no importance.
46
The Rehnquist Court in Grutter, however, emphasized the impor-
tance of individual treatment. For example, in deeming the law school's
plan narrowly tailored, it was critical that the definition of diversity was
broadly applied in a way that at least on paper had individual treat-
ment.1 47 No one, in other words, was automatically treated differently
because of his or her race.148 The Grutter majority mentions individual
treatment several times in its opinion, and the plurality in Parents
Involved heavily relies on that language. 1
49
Yet, the Grutter majority pays little actual attention to the situation
faced by the individual before it, Barbara Grutter-that as an individual
she would have been treated differently if she were of a different race. In
fact, the Court only identifies her by name once, thereafter identifying
her as "petitioner."' 5 ° She would have received an undefined "leg up" in
the admission process, and very likely would have been admitted, if she
had been African American, Hispanic, or Native American. 5'
In the end, the Grutter opinion prefers achieving diversity to indi-
vidual treatment. For example, the opinion states that "the diffusion of
knowledge and opportunity through public institutions of higher educa-
tion must be accessible to all individuals regardless of race or ethnic-
145. Justice Thomas' concurring opinion in Jenkins is the only time in the trio of school-
desegregation opinions of the Rehnquist Court that a Justice references often repeated maxims
about individual treatment at the heart of the Equal Protection Clause. See Missouri v. Jenkins,
515 U.S. 70, 120-21 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("At the heart of this interpretation of the
Equal Protection Clause lies the principle that the government must treat citizens as individuals,
and not as members of racial, ethnic, or religious groups."); id. at 137 ("It goes without saying that
only individuals can suffer from discrimination, and only individuals can receive the remedy.").
No other Justice joined the opinion.
146. The closest recognition of individual rights in the context of school desegregation is a
quote from Swann in Freeman: "The task is to correct, by a balancing of the individual and the
collective interests, the condition that offends the Constitution." Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467,
487 (1992) (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1971)).
147. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
149. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2753
(2007) ("The entire gist of the analysis in Grutter was that the admissions program at issue there
focused on each applicant as an individual ... .
150. See Parker, supra note 68, at 98.
151. It seems very likely that the plaintiff in Grutter, Barbara Grutter, would have been
admitted to the University of Michigan Law School if she had been African American or
Hispanic. See id. at 92 (noting the testimony of the plaintiff's expert that indicated "that for those
with Grutter's scores-undergraduate GPAs of 3.75 and above, and LSATs of 161-163-the
1995 admission rate for minority applicants was 100%: three out of three, while the rate for other
applicants was 9%: 13 out of 138").
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ity.' 1 52 The implication of this statement is not, however, completely
race-neutral admissions; the emphasis is on being "accessible" not
"regardless of race or ethnicity." The opinion then turns immediately to
announce the importance of integration: "Effective participation by
members of all racial and ethnic groups in the civic life of our Nation is
essential if the dream of one Nation, indivisible, is to be realized."'1
53
In short, the Court in Grutter recognizes the value of individual
treatment, and the degree of individual treatment afforded by the law
school's plan. Yet, individual treatment is not the only value of that
opinion; otherwise, Grutter would have won her case. How she was
treated does not meet Chief Justice Roberts's command that "[t]he way
to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on
the basis of race."' 54 She was treated differently because of her race
when the admission plan assigned value to applicants who were African
American, Hispanic, or Native American.
Other opinions in the voting-rights and public-contracting arenas
are more easily explainable on the grounds of individual treatment.15 5 In
these two areas, the Rehnquist Court was sympathetic to the claims of
whites who claimed discrimination from state decision-making designed
to benefit minorities. 56 Yet, individual, equal treatment was not the only
constitutional value identified in these cases. For example, the Rehnquist
Court recognized that race continues to impact us as individuals and as a
society.' 57 In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., a public contracting
case, Justice O'Connor made fairly strong statements in the majority
opinion for Croson that we should not expect an even distribution of
152. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003) (emphasis added).
153. Id. at 332.
154. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2768 (plurality opinion).
155. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995) ("At the heart of the Constitution's
guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command that the Government must treat citizens as
individuals, not as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or national class." (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting))); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224-25 (1995)
("When they touch upon an individual's race or ethnic background, he is entitled to a judicial
determination that the burden he is asked to bear on that basis is precisely tailored to serve a
compelling governmental interest."); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993) ("Laws that
explicitly distinguish between individuals on racial grounds fall within the core of that
prohibition.").
156. The Parents Involved plurality uses these precedents in defining the equal-protection goal
as equal individual treatment. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2753 (stressing the importance
of individual treatment in Grutter); id. at 2757-58 (plurality opinion) (detailing past case law on
the importance of how individuals are treated); id. at 2765 (same).
157. See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 257 (2001) ("[R]ace in this case correlates closely
with political behavior."); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 503 (1989)
("Blacks may be disproportionately attracted to industries other than construction.").
[Vol. 63:507
2009] LIMITING THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE ROBERTS STYLE 529
minorities employed in the construction field. 58 This necessarily
implies a difference among races and ethnicities, even if that difference
did not justify race-conscious goals.' 59 In the racial redistricting litiga-
tion, the Court has accepted that race and ethnicity may correlate with
political affiliation. 6 ' Similarly, in Grutter the Court recognizes that
race and ethnicity continue to matter and that this corresponds with dif-
ferent experiences."'
Granted, these statements of the Rehnquist Court simply reflect the
reality in which we live-racial and ethnic disparities and differences
cannot be denied. They are entirely absent, however, from the Parents
Involved majority and plurality opinions. These opinions have nothing at
all to say about any possible differences due to race and ethnicity. Given
its strong commitment to color-blind decision-making, it is not surpris-
ing that the Roberts Court proved unwilling to recognize meaningful
differences from race and ethnicity.
3. THE HARMS OF SEPARATISM
What is surprising, however, is that the plurality in Parents
Involved has no apparent concern with the situation faced by the two
school boards-segregated schooling. The plurality has much to say
about the value of race-neutral individual treatment by local govern-
ments, 162 but nothing to say about whether present-day segregation is
worthy of any redress or concern. It ignores the issue, thereby sug-
gesting its irrelevance to the Constitution. In Parents Involved, it takes
Justice Kennedy, along with the dissents, to describe why integration is
important. 63 Justice Kennedy goes so far as to begin his opinion by
158. Justice O'Connor spoke at length in Croson, the Richmond public contracting case,
stating that proportionality should not be expected. See 488 U.S. at 499 ("It is sheer speculation
how many minority firms there would be in Richmond absent past societal discrimination .... ).
159. Id. at 507 ("It [a thirty percent hiring goal] rests upon the 'completely unrealistic'
assumption that minorities will choose a particular trade in lockstep proportion to their
representation in the local population." (citing Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 494
(1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part))).
160. See Easley, 532 U.S. at 257 ("The evidence taken together, however, does not show that
racial considerations predominated in the drawing of District 12's boundaries. That is because
race in this case correlates closely with political behavior.").
161. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003) ("Just as growing up in a particular
region or having particular professional experiences is likely to affect an individual's views, so too
is one's own, unique experience of being a racial minority in a society, like our own, in which race
unfortunately still matters."); id. at 338 ("By virtue of our Nation's struggle with racial inequality,
such students are both likely to have experiences of particular importance to the Law School's
mission, and less likely to be admitted in meaningful numbers on criteria that ignore those
experiences.").
162. See supra notes 137-40 and accompanying text.
163. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct 2738, 2797
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("This Nation has a moral and
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stressing the importance of integration. 164
Not only did the plurality fail to mention any value associated with
integration or any harms associated with segregation, the plurality also
refused to offer any legitimacy to race-neutral means of achieving inte-
gration. The plurality declined to discuss the constitutionality of such
approaches, which were not particularly before the Court. 165 Justice
Kennedy, on the other hand, specifically approves such plans, 166 while
the dissent largely faults such approaches for their ineffectiveness and
not their unconstitutionality.
167
The plurality's hesitation to validate such plans is interesting
because school districts are often told to consider the race and ethnicity
of their students for race-conscious reasons. 168 Even the United States in
its Parents Involved brief recognized the legitimacy of such a goal:
"School districts have an unquestioned interest in reducing minority iso-
lation through race-neutral means.' 69 Similarly, legislators drawing leg-
ethical obligation to fulfill its historic commitment to creating an integrated society that ensures
equal opportunity for all of its children."); id. at 2820-21 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (articulating the
moral, educational, and democratic benefits of integration).
164. See id. at 2788 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("The
Nation's schools strive to teach that our strength comes from people of different races, creeds, and
cultures uniting in commitment to the freedom of all.").
165. See id. at 2766 (plurality opinion) ('These other means [race-neutral plans] ... implicate
different considerations than the explicit racial classifications at issue in these cases, and we
express no opinion on their validity-not even in dicta.").
166. See id. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
("[S]chool authorities ... are free to devise race-conscious measures to address the problem in a
general way and without treating each student in different fashion solely on the basis of a
systematic, individual typing by race."); id. ("These mechanisms are race conscious but do not
lead to different treatment based on a classification that tells each student he or she is to be
defined by race, so it is unlikely any of them would demand strict scrutiny to be found
permissible.").
167. See id. at 2800 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
168. For example, the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) closely monitors race and ethnicity
in determining whether schools are making adequate yearly progress. See 20 U.S.C. § 6301(3)
(2006) (characterizing the aim of the act as "closing the achievement gap between high- and low-
performing children, especially the achievement gaps between minority and nonminority students,
and between disadvantaged children and their more advantaged peers"); id. § 631 l(b)(2)(C)(v)
(setting forth in detail the requirements on closing the racial and ethnic achievement gap).
Likewise, the federal Magnet Schools Assistance Program specifically seeks the reduction of
racial and ethnic isolation. See id. § 7231(b)(1) (offering assistance for the "elimination,
reduction, or prevention of minority group isolation in elementary schools and secondary schools
with substantial proportions of minority students"). Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion discusses
state laws that encourage race-donscious measures to achieve integration. See Parents Involved,
127 S. Ct. at 2831-33 (Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at 2833 ("[T]oday's opinion will require setting
aside the laws of several States and many local communities."). The plurality states, with almost
no analysis, that NCLB has "nothing to do with the pertinent issues in these cases." Id. at 2766
(plurality opinion).
169. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 7, Parents Involved,
127 S. Ct. 2738 (No. 05-908).
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islative voting districts can consider race and ethnicity and yet not
trigger strict scrutiny so long as race and ethnicity is not the predominant
factor in line drawing. 170 This refusal to state the constitutionality of
race-neutral means suggests again the disinterest in the plurality in fur-
thering integration. The focus of the plurality is on other matters
altogether.
The disinterest in the harms of segregation stands in contrast to that
of its predecessor Court. The Rehnquist Court often considered the
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause in cases of whites claiming
racial discrimination in the context of race-conscious public contracting
and legislative districting. In evaluating these situations of separation
designed to benefit minorities, that Court stressed the importance of
eliminating different treatment-not an end in and of itself as in Parents
Involved-so that we could eliminate the explicitly identified harms of
segregation.' 7 ' For example, in the voting-rights arena, the Rehnquist
Court has expressed grave concern with the "balkanization" inherent in
majority-minority voting districts and other forms of segregation."7 2
Apart from the balkanization issue, the Court writes in ways that
strongly imply that any special treatment stigmatizes minorities, regard-
less of whether it is state sponsored or not.' 73 To treat a minority differ-
170. In the context of drawing voting districts, the Supreme Court has specifically held that
race and ethnicity can be considered and not entail an illegal classification. Only when the
"facially neutral law ... is unexplainable on grounds other than race" and race is the predominant
factor in line drawing is the demanding strict scrutiny triggered. Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541,
546 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).
171. See, e.g., Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 603 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
("They endorse race-based reasoning and the conception of a Nation divided into racial blocs, thus
contributing to an escalation of racial hostility and conflict."); id. at 610 ("We are a Nation not of
black and white alone, but one teeming with divergent communities knitted together by various
traditions and carried forth, above all, by individuals."); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) ("[A] quota is a divider of society, a
creator of castes, and it is all the worse for its racial base, especially in a society desperately
striving for an equality that will make race irrelevant." (quoting ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE
MORALITY OF CONSENT 133 (1975))).
172. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995) ("Just as the State may not, absent
extraordinary justification, segregate citizens on the basis of race in its public parks, buses, golf
courses, beaches, and schools, so did we recognize in Shaw that it may not separate its citizens
into different voting districts on the basis of race." (citations omitted)); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S.
630, 657 (1993) ("Racial gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may balkanize us into
competing racial factions; it threatens to carry us further from the goal of a political system in
which race no longer matters ....").
173. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 229 (1995) ("[A] statute of
this kind inevitably is perceived by many as resting on an assumption that those who are granted
this special preference are less qualified in some respect that is identified purely by their race."
(quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 545 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting))); Metro
Broad., 497 U.S. at 636 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Special preferences also can foster a view that
members of the favored groups are inherently less able to compete on their own."); Croson, 488
U.S. at 493 (plurality opinion) ("Classifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic
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ently, according to the Court's approach, implies a stereotype and
inferiority. 174 This concern with stereotypes is also reflected in the cases
outlawing the consideration of race when using peremptory chal-
lenges. 75 Likewise, in Grutter, the Rehnquist Court voiced opposition
to separatism. 176
At its core, this approach prizes not just equal treatment before the
law, but a sense that we are all better off when we are together; that
separation runs counter to the spirit of the Equal Protection Clause. The
Court could have decided the opinions, except for Grutter,177 solely for
the importance of equal individual treatment under the Equal Protection
Clause. Instead, the Court noted at length another constitutional value-
the elimination of segregation as part of the equal-protection equation as
well.
I do not mean to suggest that the Rehnquist Court was pro-integra-
tion. It foreclosed significantly the availability of school-desegregation
remedies to effectuate integration through its limited view of judicial
power. 178 Instead, the Rehnquist Court prized, at the request of whites,
equal treatment because of the harms of separateness. It tells us that
separateness is harmful for whites (because it balkanizes) and minorities
(because it also stigmatizes and stereotypes). Individual equal treatment
was not the only value in cases valuing equal individual treatment. The
harm .... [T]hey may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial
hostility.").
174. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 968 (1996) (plurality opinion) ("But to the extent
that race is used as a proxy for political characteristics, a racial stereotype requiring strict scrutiny
is in operation."); id. at 985 ("Our Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence evinces a commitment to
eliminate unnecessary and excessive governmental use and reinforcement of stereotypes."); Shaw,
509 U.S. at 647 ("It [racial gerrymandering] reinforces the perception that members of the same
racial group-regardless of their age, education, economic status, or the community in which they
live-think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the
polls."); Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 604 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Such policies may embody
stereotypes that treat individuals as the product of their race, evaluating their thoughts and
efforts-their very worth as citizens-according to a criterion barred to the Government by
history and the Constitution.").
175. See, e.g., Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991) ("Race cannot be a proxy for
determining juror bias or competence."); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 104 (1986) (Marshall,
J., concurring) ("[T]he Equal Protection Clause prohibits a State from taking any action based on
crude, inaccurate racial stereotypes ....").
176. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003) ("[Tihe diffusion of knowledge and
opportunity through public institutions of higher education must be accessible to all individuals
regardless of race and ethnicity."); id. at 332 ("Effective participation by members of all racial and
ethnic groups in the civic life of our Nation is essential if the dream of one Nation, indivisible, is
to be realized."); id. ("In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the
citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified
individuals of every race and ethnicity.").
177. See supra text accompanying notes 148-49.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 7-9.
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Rehnquist Court used the Equal Protection Clause to promote together-
ness, while the Roberts Court has no concern with togetherness at all.
4. STRUCTURAL VALUE OF LOCAL CONTROL
Another prominent value in the Rehnquist Court's Equal Protection
Clause jurisprudence was the importance of local control in the educa-
tion setting. When the Court has limited the reach of school-desegrega-
tion remedies, it has explicitly emphasized the limited nature of judicial
power and the importance of local control over K-12 education as the
justifications for limiting desegregation remedies.' 79
For example, in the Oklahoma City school-desegregation opinion,
Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized in the majority opinion that school-
desegregation decrees must end to return schools to local control, even if
it came at the expense of resegregation."'8 In fact, Justice Kennedy
wrote in the majority opinion in Freeman v. Pitts that the "ultimate
objective" of school-desegregation litigation is the return of local con-
trol-not an end to school segregation or inequality."8 ' Similarly, in the
Kansas City school-desegregation opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist held
that the district court's remedy reached beyond judicial authority, which
is restrained by local control.' 82
In doing so, the Court has stressed the value of political processes
in setting educational agenda 8 3 and the need of fostering community
support in that agenda.184 The superior competency of local school
179. See Parker, supra note 109, at 1705-39 (analyzing the federalism implications of school-
desegregation jurisprudence). Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion argued the importance of
allowing local choice over voluntary race-conscious integration plans. See Parents Involved in
Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2826 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
("[G]iving some degree of weight to a local board's knowledge, expertise, and concerns . . .
simply recognizes that judges are not well suited to act as school administrators."). The plurality
labeled the argument as one of affording school districts deference, a principle it rejected as
"fundamentally at odds with our equal protection jurisprudence." Id. at 2766 (plurality opinion)
(quoting Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 506 n.1 (2005)). Yet, the outcome in Grutter
fundamentally depends on deference. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328 ("The Law School's
educational judgment that such diversity is essential to its education mission is one to which we
defer."); Parker, supra note 68, at 85-86 (analyzing the importance of deference in Grutter).
180. 498 U.S. 237, 248 (1991).
181. 503 U.S. 467, 489 (1992).
182. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 102 (1995).
183. See, e.g., Freeman, 503 U.S. at 490 ("When the school district and all state entities
participating with it in operating the schools make decisions in the absence of judicial supervision,
they can be held accountable to the citizenry, to the political process, and to the courts in the
ordinary course."); Dowell, 498 U.S. at 248 ("Local control over the education of children allows
citizens to participate in decisionmaking, and allows innovation so that school programs can fit
local needs.").
184. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-42 (1974) ("[L]ocal autonomy has long
been thought essential both to the maintenance of community concern and support for public
schools and to quality of the educational process.").
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boards to establish educational policy was another common justifica-
tion.'85 In Parents Involved these values receive no attention, which is
ironic given that we now have school districts voluntarily pursuing what
was once court-ordered-student integration. 
86
Related to the importance of local control in education is the defer-
ence to higher education afforded in Grutter.8 7 Deference was a key
part of the Court's decision in Grutter, as discussed above. The majority
opinion in Grutter is explicit in its endorsement and use of deference.
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke also has an element of deference as
well.' 88 Yet, in Parents Involved, the Court quickly rejects deference in
the K-12 inquiry, as contrary to standard equal-protection jurispru-
dence.' 89 Left unexplained, however, is why the Roberts Court now
rejects the values of local control and deference to educators over educa-
tional policy.
CONCLUSION
This Essay argues that the Roberts Court is signaling a very differ-
ent approach to both Brown and the Equal Protection Clause than the
Rehnquist Court. Its exclusive focus on individual treatment demon-
strates a one-dimensional approach to an incredibly complex problem.
The Court is apparently asking us all to behave as George Costanza did
in a Seinfeld episode, when he had hired an African American extermi-
nator to demonstrate his racial sensitivity to his new African American
boss. When asked whether his friend Jerry was white, here's how
George responded: "Jerry [Seinfeld]? Yes, I suppose he is white. You
know, I never really thought about it. I don't see people in terms of
color."' 190 While the line elicits its desired laughter (George's feigned
ignorance is obviously false), this is how the Parents Involved plurality
wants the government to treat us-as if-we have no color, no race-
185. See, e.g., id. at 744 ("This is a task which few, if any, judges are qualified to perform and
one which would deprive the people of control of their schools through their elected
representatives.").
186. See McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 851 (W.D. Ky. 2004)
("It would seem rather odd that the concepts of equal protection, local control and limited
deference are now only one-way streets to a particular educational policy, virtually prohibiting the
voluntary continuation of policies once required by law."), aff'd per curiam, 416 F.3d 513 (6th
Cir. 2005), rev'd sub nom. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct.
2738 (2007).
187. Michelle Adams calls this "Grunter-style deference" to distinguish it from "federalism-
based deference" found in school-desegregation jurisprudence. See Adams, supra note 68, at 960.
188. Justice Powell reasoned in Bakke that the "good faith" of the university would be
"presumed." See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318-19 (1978) (opinion of
Powell, J.).
189. See supra text accompanying note 70.
190. Seinfeld: The Diplomat Club (NBC television broadcast May 4, 1995).
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when it is painfully obvious that we do. This approach differs signifi-
cantly from the Rehnquist Court. That Court took a much more nuanced
look at race and recognized the harms of segregation, the benefits of
integration, the value of local control, in addition to the value of individ-
ual treatment. The difference strongly suggests that the Roberts Court
will eventually shift equal-protection jurisprudence in more fundamental
ways than the Rehnquist Court.
